Abstract-Cyber security defense systems have evolved in the last years with innovative approaches and new Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) capable of identifying cyber-threats that had gone unnoticed to date. However, new protection challenges are raised by the upcoming fifth generation (5G) mobile technology with new and advanced features. 5G will make that existing detection procedures become obsolete in case they are not adapted accordingly. This paper proposes a 5G-oriented architecture with which to conduct the analysis of network flows to identify cyber-threats in 5G mobile networks efficiently and quickly, by making use of deep learning techniques. Experiments on the proposed system with inspection capabilities are also included, so as to analyze and determine how many network flows, gathered from the 5G subscribers' User Equipments (UE), we can inspect in real-time. These outcomes can give us clues about when and why protection systems in 5G will stop detecting cyber-attacks for overload reasons.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Cyber security researchers and professionals have designed and developed a number of defense systems to protect assets of organizations from malicious ill-intended attackers, addressing cyber security threats such as virus, Trojans, worms, and botnets, among others [1] . Existing solutions based on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) include (pro-)active approaches to anticipate and remove vulnerabilities in their system with which to trigger reactive actions for mitigation. However, these approaches need to adapt and evolve toward new technologies and communication networks facing new cyber-threats.
Any protection mechanism, such as the ones based on IDS, needs to operate by integrating algorithms with good and precise detection capabilities, allowing quick processing of the data gathered by the information sources. Without these capabilities, IDSs cannot perform their monitoring and analysis functions in real time, making it almost impossible to detect potential cyber-attacks. This problem is because current networks provide increasingly high transmission rates, going in a few years from 100 Mbps to the current data rate of 10 Gbps in wired networks. Large volumes of information flowing through networks make IDSs ineffective to gather and analyze every network packet. As an example, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) tools like Snort [2] can properly work on wired networks up to 1 Gbps, starting to discard packets due to overhead from 1.5 Gbps [3] . In order to improve performance, many works are focused on advanced parallelization techniques based on hardware accelerators. Among them, techniques based on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) support speeds of up to 4 Gbps without loss [4] , while the ones based on Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) reach speeds close to 7.2 Gbps [5] .
Due to the increase of bandwidth, IDS-based solutions making deep analysis were forced to evolve toward new ways of detection, moving from inspecting raw network packets to analyzing traffic network flows with innovative AI-based techniques [6] . For example, a Block-Based Neural Network (BBNN) for an anomaly-based IDS achieved around 22 Gbps throughput by using an FPGA architecture [7] . In this context, a complete survey focused on solutions to quickly classify collected network flows to detect attacks or malicious code can be found in [8] . Nonetheless, these solutions appear to be insufficient in the coming years, since networks with even higher transmission speeds are predicted. Currently, a huge promotional effort is being made to raise the new upcoming fifth generation (5G) mobile technology. The new advanced features of 5G will make that existing detection procedures become obsolete in case they are not adapted accordingly.
The 5G-PPP consortium has identified a pool of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) [9] that have a high impact when analyzing and inspecting traffic network flows. It needs to determine certain characteristics of the incoming network flow in an efficient and quick way so that detection procedures be a success. Among these KPIs, we next highlight four of them that make detection procedures an even greater challenge in 5G mobile networks.
• 1000 times higher mobile data volume per geographical area.
• 10 to 100 times more connected devices.
• 10 times to 100 times higher typical user data rate.
• End-to-End latency of <1ms. As shown, the large number of User Equipments (UE) belonging to 5G subscribers, the large volumes of traffic data produced by them, as well as the reduced latency in connectivity makes us face new challenges to be solved without losing detection accuracy in real-time scenarios.
Our contribution with the article at hand is the proposal of a 5G-oriented architecture to efficiently and quickly conduct the analysis of network flows to identify cyber-threats in 5G mobile networks, by making use of deep learning techniques. Our aim is not to measure the accuracy of these methods, but their runtime performance, because we need to figure out if they are suitable for this architecture, given its response time restrictions. To this end, several performance experiments are also included so as to analyze and determine how many network flows, gathered from 5G subscribers' UEs, we can inspect in real-time by using the inspection capabilities proposed next.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we outline the proposed architecture for inspecting network flows in 5G mobile networks, detailing the features extracted from such network flows and the deep learningbased inspection techniques we propose to use for detection. Section III shows the experiments conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, while conclusions and future work are finally drawn in Section IV.
II. PROPOSAL FOR NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION IN 5G
Our proposal provides a network anomaly detection system integrated into the 5G architecture. We present next how our system is distributed and interact with other elements in 5G networks, as well as which network flow features and deep learning based techniques are used.
A. Architecture for network inspection
5G networks are conceived as extremely flexible infrastructures based on an architecture organized by functional planes that provides separation of concerns to simplify and address the complete system requirements. Among these planes, we propose a high-level design of the management and orchestration plane, following the ETSI NFV architecture [10] , which have also been used as basis by other proposals [11] , [12] . The architecture, as shown in Fig. 2 , consists of four groups of components: Virtualized Infrastructure (VI); Virtualized Network Functions (VNF); Management and Orchestration (MANO); and Operations and Business Support Systems (OSS/BSS). The VI group virtualizes the physical resources (computing, storage, and network) and exposes them for consumption by VNFs. The MANO group manages the combination of VNFs implementing network services, the full life cycle of VNFs, the deployment of VNFs into virtualized resources, and the network slicing for supporting multitenancy. Therefore, MANO controls the general behavior of the infrastructure by considering the policy set defined by Virtual Network Operators (VNO) of the OSS/BSS. Among these policies, the VNO must define security policies to be applied into the network resources under its control. The Security Policy Manager module takes into account these security policies and decides the best actions after evaluating the input provided by the Monitoring and Diagnoser module. This module must process the current monitoring information generated by the network resources and identify the causes from any anomaly detected. In order to achieve effective network anomaly detection, we propose a system, depicted in Fig. 1 , which is composed by virtualized components with two functions: Anomaly Symptom Detection (ASD) and Network Anomaly Detection (NAD). The former is located into the Radio Access Network (RAN) infrastructure, and it is focused on the quick search of anomaly symptom, i.e., any trace or sign of anomaly in the network traffic generated by UEs connected to the RAN. On the other hand, the latter is a collector of timestampted and RAN-associated symptoms, where a central process analyses the timeline and the relation of these symptoms to identify any network anomaly. Once an anomaly is produced, it is immediately communicated to the Monitoring and Diagnoser module.
Our system also proposes the use of flow analysis as a technical mechanism, extracting anomaly symptoms from the network traffic. Although, applying Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) permits a deep search into the L2/3 flows, even identifying specific applications, it could be too resource consuming considering 5G mobile data volume. Therefore, the instantiation of DPI-based mechanisms may be deployed in particular cases for specific events or policy actions; for example, after botnet detection in a specific RAN. In fact, both approaches can be combined into a two-stage detection process.
Moreover, our proposal is easily flexible, because of allowing to dynamically deploy new virtualized resources in order to detect anomaly symptoms in a particular RAN when network traffic increases; and also extensible, since the symptom detection, which is the most expensive analysis process, is distributed among RANs, while the anomaly detection is centralized in the core network, known as Evolved Packet Core (EPC), only requiring symptoms as input.
In order to implement both analysis functions, there are several machine learning alternatives, some related to deep learning. However, a key aspect is to identify the network flow features that will be analyzed in order to detect anomaly symptoms. In our proposal, accounting flows is a two-step process: flow exporting and flow collection. The flow exporter, also known as observation point, is responsible for the metering process, i.e., creating flow records from observed traffic. The flow collector is in charge of retrieving and storing the flows created by the flow exporter as well as sending network flow features in a way suitable to the anomaly symptom detection module.
B. Network flow features
Flow export requires a protocol, e.g., NetFlow, which defines how flow records are transported to the flow collector. NetFlow transports flow records containing source and destination IP addresses and ports, start and end timestamps, type of service, level 3 protocol, TCP flags, next hop router, input and output SNMP interfaces, source and destination autonomous systems, and network masks. Moreover, each flow carries aggregated information about the number of packets and bytes exchanged.
Each flow record could be directly sent from the flow collector to the symptom detection module. However, the flow record is too simple and only allows extracting a few features. A step forward is to obtain aggregated views, choosing a set of flow records [13] . In this case, a timer and/or accounting function triggers the aggregation process to extract features from flow records. TABLE I shows our proposal of features extracted from a set of flow records.
The number of features can be increased if the aggregation view is computed taking several time periods in a multi-scale way, e.g., a feature vector could consider 1-hour, 1-minute, and 1-second periods. This process will be made every a configurable number of flows received, acting as a sliding window. In addition, the required features depend on the network anomaly types to be detected; for example, finding TCP anomalies (e.g., TCP port scanning) only requires TCP features.
C. Deep learning-based inspection techniques
Many artificial intelligence tasks can be solved by choosing the right representation or set of features, and then providing them to a simple machine learning algorithm. However, it is not easy to know which features should be extracted (this being called learning representation problem). Deep learning essentially uses the well-known multilayer perceptron to obtain, in a unsupervised way, higher level representations expressed in terms of other simpler ones. Each layer can be seen as another step of a computer program that uses the previous layer's result as input.
Deep learning algorithms have achieved state-of-art results in a range of difficult problem domains, involving supervised and unsupervised learning. Several types of deep learning neural networks can be found; namely: Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Deep Belief Networks (DBN), Restricted Boltzman Machines (RBM), Long Short-Term Memory Recurrent Networks (LSTMRN), just to name a few. Each of them is particularly well suited to deal with a different sort of classification problems. In computer networks, anomaly detection has been subject of study for decades, and many approaches have been explored [14] , [15] and the deep learning perspective has received special attention in recent years [16] .
In our architecture, the anomaly detection is arranged in two levels, as shown in Fig. 3 . At the low level, the Flow Collector gets all the different flows during a given period of time, calculates a vector of features that the ASD module will classify as anomalous or normal. This initial classification has to be made as quick as possible, even sacrificing accuracy for a lower response time. If an anomaly is suspected, a symptom packet composed of the feature vector involved, a time stamp, and the type of anomaly detected, is sent to the next level, the NAD module. The NAD receives several streams of symptoms from all the ASDs, sorts them by their time stamps and assembles a time sequence of symptoms. The task of deciding whether this sequence belongs to any of a set of attack categories can be seen as a symptom-sequence classification problem.
Essentially, anomaly detection techniques can operate in one of the following three modes [14] :
• Supervised detection: A training set with traffic labeled as normal or anomalous is available.
• Semi-supervised detection: The training set contains only normal traffic, and anything that does not belong to this kind of traffic is considered anomalous.
• Unsupervised detection: No labeled training set is necessary. In the supervised detection, the main issue is how to build a really comprehensive training set with all the anomalous traffic properly labeled. This can be hard to achieve and harder to maintain. In this case, every piece of traffic belonging to one of the defined categories will be correctly classified, but if a new type of traffic anomaly appears, it will be incorrectly classified. In fact, the usual technique to obtain a labeled training set consists in injecting anomalous traffic in a normal traffic stream, because this kind of set is not readily available. There are several reasons for this, such as the excessive effort needed to collect that sort of data, the level of expert knowledge that would be necessary for the analysis, or by users' privacy issues. Due to this, together with the huge amount of data expected in 5G networks to be examined for keeping this set updated, it is necessary to make the training process as independent as possible from the availability of labeled anomalous data. However, when a classifier is tested in a network widely different from the one where training data were taken from, the detection performance drops [17] . Unsupervised anomaly detection methods have been proposed [18] so that the knowledge of traffic behavior on which the model is based can be progressively constructed and dynamically evolve over time. Unfortunately, in our case they are not suitable because building and training in situ such a self-learning model is a costly process. We are interested in time-effective solutions that offer sufficient accuracy with a low evaluation runtime, in order to process the huge amount of features that our architecture needs to manage per second; especially, features coming from large volumes of input information in 5G mobile networks. Among the semi-supervised learning methods, Deep Belief Networks (DBN) and Stacked AutoEncoders (SAE) have demonstrated to be effective at learning invariant features from complex and high-dimensional datasets. The Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is the building block of a DBN [19] , where each layer is separately greedily trained as a RBM that takes the input from the feature layer learned in the previous layer. SAE uses the same idea to train stacked autoencoders in an unsupervised way, one at a time, to obtain a set of more descriptive low-dimension features. Both can be fine-tuned by means of backpropagation layers in a supervised way [18] , [13] .
In this paper, we focus on analyzing the performance of the ASD module. The huge amount of traffic that each RAN must support makes it crucial to be able to process a sufficient number of flows per second, even though the detection is not as precise as it could be. Bearing in mind this, it is desirable that the selected machine learning method meets the following requirements:
• It should be suitable for efficient execution on a GPU.
• It should be computed in a constant number of operations for a given feature vector size.
• It should have the same memory requirements regardless the number of samples used in training.
• It should achieve good accuracy in classification but it does not need to be extremely accurate. A complex issue is the definition of anomaly. An anomaly is something that can appear infrequently, and it is tightly linked to the concept of normality. Essentially, we can consider as anomalous all the network traffic that does not fit in the normal class. Consequently, anomaly detection systems should not be limited by any predefined set of anomalies, and they should be flexible enough to adapt themselves to any unknown event affecting the network.
Currently we are not interested in the accuracy of the detection mechanism, but exclusively in the execution time. Due to this, we have not make use of existing labeled datasets, so that features have been generated randomly. There are a wide variety of suitable machine learning techniques, but DBN and SAE have been the chosen models for this experimental work. They essentially share the same structure, and the prediction can be computed by using matrix operations. Some works, as the one presented in [18] , propose to use a Support Vector Machine (SVM) as a final supervised classifier. We have initially avoided this approach, because the number of support vectors obtained during the training phase depends on the dataset and this can make it difficult to obtain an upper bound of the execution time. Three different depth architectures with one, three, and six hidden layers have been selected to be evaluated. The needed depth depends on whether the architecture can capture the large degree of variation that occurs in the network data. These models have to be previously trained by using a training set labeled as normal or anomalous. If no labeled set is available, we can convert a DBN into a semi-supervised method, simply training with the normal network traffic and using the DBN as a sort of Discriminative RBM without any further backpropagation layer [17] . Even in this case, the matrix operations needed to obtain the prediction are essentially the same.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
There are a significant number of libraries and frameworks related to deep learning that can be used to train our model. They have to be capable of managing LSTM Recurrent Networks (this is the model we have planned to use in our NAD) and DBNs. It must also have support for multiple GPUs and, optionally, allow multi-node parallel execution for future extensions. The ones selected from those which meet the requirements were: Tensorflow [20] , Caffe [21] , Torch [22] , Theano [23] , Deeplearning4j [24] , and MXNet [25] . All of them have been widely used in all kinds of high performance projects.
Researchers are usually interested in the training time of the model because is the more time-consuming part in deep learning. However, we need a framework that also evaluates the trained model as quick as possible due to the time restrictions inherent to our problem. Although it can be argued that such a framework is not strictly necessary to make predictions, we do not want to discard the possibility of having a continuous supervised/unsupervised refinement of the deep learning model.
In this experimental work, Tensorflow's performance has been evaluated by using a DBN model, where the input layer has the same size as the feature vector, and the output layer size is 2, so that softmax can be used to estimate the likelihood of belonging to the normal or anomalous class. As future work, the number of outputs can be extended to match the different potentially detected attacks, acting as a symptom label. This can be made by simply adding as many output neurons as classes to detect, and lightly increasing the number of neurons in each hidden layer if necessary. The chosen architectures are:
• One hidden full layer of 128 floats.
• Three hidden full layers of 128, 64, and 32 floats.
• Six hidden full layers of 128, 96, 64, 48, 32, and 16 floats. In order to obtain an upper bound, we have assumed that the batched feature vectors arrive at maximum speed, and that the CPU uses them to evaluate the DBN or to feed the DBN executed by the GPU; normally by means of a memory copy. Several factors have to be taken into account when we want to reach the best performance. The batch size has great influence on the execution time, regardless the processor that evaluates the model. If the model is evaluated by the CPU, increasing the batch size will cause more cache/TLB misses and page faults. If the model is evaluated by the GPU, increasing the batch size will decrease the execution time, but will increase the time spent on transferring the batch to the GPU's memory. In this experimental work, we have used only one GPU, so the batch size is limited by the GPU's memory size. Although deep learning frameworks usually try to optimize the memory usage, they replicate certain structures in some specific models (e.g., CNNs) in order to improve parallelism at the cost of a greater memory usage.
Every layer in the model has a matrix-vector product associated. For example, in the three hidden model, the sizes of the matrices when the input is a 128-element feature vector and the output layer has 2 neurons are 128 × 128, 128 × 64, 64 × 32, and 32 × 2 float elements.
We carried out the performance evaluation using a workstation with 32GB of RAM, a six-core Intel i7-5930K at 3.5GHz with hyper-threading running Linux, and one NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 with 8GB RAM. Tensorflow 1.0 over CUDA 8.0, and CUDNN 5.1 has been used.
A. Determining the optimum batch size
Tensorflow is a software library for numerical computation based on data flow graphs, where the nodes represent operations and the edges represent the tensors communicated between them. Its flexible architecture allows deploying computation to one or more CPUs or GPUs in a variety of hardware platforms with a single API. We have decided to take it as a black box and to use a benchmark executed during the installation procedure of our software on each ASD. Its execution takes approximately two hours, but it has to be done just once. This allows us to determine the optimum batch size for every given vector size, for a wide range of values, and for the three aforementioned deep-learning model architectures.
For the shake of clarity, only the resulting performance for the six hidden layer neural network running on the GPU is shown in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that the speedup, as a function of the vector size when the batch size is fixed, is not linear. There might be too many reasons for this fact (memory transfer time, computing time, number of GPU threads, CUDA's grid and block dimensions, among others), and they should be analyzed, but our goal is not to give an insightful description of this behavior, but tuning our software to maximize its performance.
Although the number of potential features can be unlimited, we have fixed our feature vector to 128 elements. With this input vector size and running the models on our workstation, the best batch size in the three neural network architectures are 2 17 = 131 072, 2 15 = 32 768, and 2 15 = 32 768 for one, three, and six hidden layers, respectively (see Fig. 5 ).
B. CPU versus GPU performance
Once the feature vector size has been fixed, Fig. 5 shows the number of feature vectors processed per second for a CPU and a GPU with each batch size.
GPUs have become an essential tool for machine learning computation, because deep learning models are really well suited to be executed on them. The more complex and independent the computations, the more impressive the performance gain.
Our model can be considered as not too deep, and the matrices as really small when comparing with the ones typically used by other deep learning models (e.g., CNNs). In this case, the time spent to transfer the batch from main memory to the GPU cannot be disregarded and it compensates the greater GPU performance. Fig. 5 shows little performance difference between CPU and GPU in the one-layer architecture for sizes 2 18 and 2 19 . Nevertheless, by choosing the right batch size (2 17 ) the GPU reaches 2.85 million vectors per second, doubling the CPU's performance. The CPU's best mark is 1.83 million feature vectors per second with a batch size of 2 15 . The speedup in throughput of GPU with respect to CPU for large batch sizes is rather small: the speedup ranges from a minimum of 1.28 and a maximum of 1.83.
When the number of layers increases, the gap between CPU and GPU performance increases dramatically. In the six-layer model, the speedup ranges from a minimum of 2.2 with a batch size of 2 19 , and a maximum of 3.06 with a batch size of 2 15 . The maximum performance in this case is 2.47 million feature vectors per second.
The GPU performances for the three models are rather similar. This proves that the GPU's 2 560 cores have a huge computing power on high parallelizable computations like matrix-vector product, making us to conclude that the majority of the time is spent in data transfers instead of calculations. There can be an opportunity to improve the global performance when several GPUs are used, if we manage to overlap computations and DMA transfers.
As a conclusion of the experiments commented earlier, consider a 5G scenario as simple and realistic as possible with a city of 1 million of habitants; each of them having only one UE at will for the sake of simplicity. These UEs will be connected to the eNBs -elements of the LTE Radio Access Network for connectivity purposes-, demanding services and each generating 10 flows per second (fps) on average. In order to offer proper wireless connectivity, that city maintains a RAN in which there is deployed 50 eNBs where the UEs will be connected, supposing in this example a perfect balancing of 20 000 UEs per eNB, and one Flow Collector per eNB; that is, each Flow Collector will be managing 200 000 fps. If we suppose a sliding window pace of one flow, this fact will suppose having 200 000 feature vectors per second coming from each Flow Collector. As seen in the experiments, this number could be perfectly managed per each Flow Collector separately even by a CPU with a batch size of 2 15 . Instead, when taking 10 eNBs (from 50) sending data to the ASD through the corresponding Flow Collectors, we should obtain 2 million of feature vectors per second. This will overload an ASD using a single CPU. However, a single GPU can manage this situation easily, as shown in Fig. 5 .
In this 5G scenario, the worst possible case will be when taking all the eNBs running at the same time in the RAN, generating 10 million of flows in total. This could not be assumed with the experimental settings presented before. As a solution, we propose two mechanisms: dynamically deploy more computational resources, through new virtualized components as VNFs; or adapting the flow aggregation frequency in order to reduce the number of feature vectors collected.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A novel two-level deep machine learning model has been proposed in the context of a 5G mobile network architecture, in which is expected larger data volumes than in the existing wired or wireless networks. This fact will make to adapt the current detection capabilities to inspect all the network traffic in real-time. In this case, the first level in our module is a supervised or semi-supervised learning model implementing a DBN or a SAE running on every RAN as quick as possible. This sacrifices some accuracy due to the amount of traffic data that a RAN supports. Its task is to detect symptoms, that is, local anomalous traffic conditions happening during a configurable short time period. All the collected symptoms are sent to our NAD, where they are assembled and used as input for a LSTM Recurrent Network trained in a supervised way to recognize temporal patterns of typical attacks.
A number of experiments have also been conducted to measure the feasibility of our system, obtaining a peak performance of 2.47 million feature vectors per second. In this sense, we have proposed two mechanisms to improve performance by adapting the aggregation pace, at the expense of accuracy, and dedicating more virtualized resources, when they are needed.
Several directions for future improvement can be considered. Firstly, in this paper we have only evaluated Tensorflow, but it would be necessary to make a comprehensive comparative performance evaluation of deep learning frameworks, so as to determine the best suited one for reaching the highest processing performance. And finally, it is necessary to train the two different levels using real data and evaluate the accuracy of the anomaly detection architecture as a whole.
